Final Governance Smart Contract Design

Note: This is a mirror of a proposal originally posted within the community on Discord here. The proposal was discussed, voted on, and unanimously accepted.

Introduction: Before delving into the details of this proposal, we strongly recommend that you first read the article and the initial governance proposition. These will provide important context for the proposed governance smart contract design approach as well as the background behind the changes done to the initial proposition.

Objective: The objective of this proposal is to agree on the parameters of the governance smart contract, focusing on the design elements rather than specific values (values can be determined later). In this way we will be able to finish governor implementation.

The Governance is based on the POS idea → to gain voting rights one have to stake their tokens as explained in the article and the initial governance proposition.

1. Voting Period: Voting will be divided into three periods as explained in the initial governance proposition.

2. Vote Types: One can vote in three ways: agree disagree and disagree and slash proposer as explained in the initial governance proposition.

3. Minimum Stake to Create a Proposal: This parameter will be expressed as a percentage of the total stake. For instance, it could be set at 1%. In practical terms, if there were 100 million Abax tokens staked, a user would need to stake 1 million tokens to create a proposal.

4. Unstaking Period Duration: This parameter will define the duration for unstaking, during which the user loses voting rights. Once unstaking has begun, it cannot be stopped until completion. Users can choose to unstake any portion of their tokens.

5. Reward Structure: A flat amount of tokens will be distributed all stakers each block, with distribution being proportional to their stake.

6. Inactivity Penalty: Inactive voters may face a penalty in the form of being forcefully unstaked. This penalty can only be applied if the voting participation falls below a certain threshold (e.g., less than 50% of votes cast during the initial 10 days).

7. Proposer Penalty: To discourage spam proposals, proposers may be subject to a penalty, such as a small percentage (e.g., 0.05%) of the total stake, if the majority of votes result in a ‘disagree and slash proposer’ outcome.